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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
DEE HENSHAW,
Appellant,
vs.

i

Case No. 950087-CA

!i

(Civil No. 920900687 CN)

UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF TRANS- ]
PORTATION and IRENE SWEENEY,
]>
Appellees.

Priority No. 15

!

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION
The Supreme Court of Utah has original appellate jurisdiction
over this appeal from the judgment in favor of UDOT under Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (j) (Supp. 1994).

This Court now has jurisdiction

under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4) (Supp. 1994).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1. Whether the Third District Court correctly granted summary
judgment on the ground the Complaint failed to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted.
2. Whether the Third District Court correctly granted summary
judgment on the ground Plaintiff's causes of action were timebarred •
1

STANDARD OF REVIEW
The

issues

are

questions

of

law

to

be

reviewed

for

correctness. Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 235 (Utah
1993) .
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
The following statutes are determinative of certain issues
raised in the appeal and are supplied verbation in Addendum A:
Utah Code Ann, § 63-30-3 (1993).
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(6) (1993).
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-12 (1993).
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-1 (1992).
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-26 (1992).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

NATURE OF CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BELOW
A.

Nature of Case

The appeal is from a summary judgment of the Third District
Court in favor of UDOT ruling that Appellant Henshaw's claims fail
to state a claim and are time-barred.

The claims as to which

Henshaw appeals are in contract and fraud.
Henshaw claims that UDOT breached a contract of sale of a
piece of property because UDOT did not provide a warranty deed and
title insurance to Henshaw despite his alleged tender of payment
under the contract.

UDOT responds to the contract claims that

after negotiations UDOT conveyed the property to Henshaw by
2

warranty deed for less than the contract price, and purchased title
insurance and was prepared to have placed in Henshaw's name as soon
as Henshaw recorded the deed, which he did not do.

Henshaw

tendered no evidence showing he was damaged in any way.
Henshaw had no right of possession at the time he claims his
contractual right to quiet possession was breached, having assigned
his interest away.

Further UDOT took no action that could be

considered a breach of any covenant of quiet possession.
Henshaw

claims

fraud

(without

specifically pleading

it)

because UDOT sold to Henshaw's assignor (Sweeney) property that
turned out to have title defects. But UDOT completely cleared up
any title defects and conveyed to Henshaw clear title -- for a
price lower than the contract required.
claims

are barred

because

In any event, the fraud

of non-compliance

with

the

claim

requirements of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.
All the claims are time-barred.

Plaintiff failed to file any

claim or complaint within the time required by statute.
The confusing and deficient nature of Plaintiff's claims are
introduced by Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint, attached hereto
as Addendum B.
B.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below

UDOT is satisfied with Henshaw's statement of the course of
proceedings and will not repeat it here. The disposition relevant
to this appeal is the District Court's entry of summary judgment in
favor of UDOT on September 26, 1994.
3

II.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
In 1973, UDOT condemned certain property belonging to Irene

Sweeney in Emigration Canyon; UDOT satisfied the condemnation
judgment by trading to Sweeney a portion of the property at issue.
(R. 378, 383-385, Affid. Williams1 1 4 and Ex. 1; R. 397, Affid.
1 3.)

UDOT and Sweeney believed at the time of transfer that the

piece of property UDOT transferred to Sweeney in trade had clear
title, but acknowledge now it did not.

(R. 379, Affid. H 5; R.

533-535, Affid. % 4 and Ex. A.)
On May 27, 1976, Sweeney and Plaintiff, Dee Henshaw, entered
into a contract for sale by Sweeney of the property that is the
subject of this appeal (R. 379, 385-387, Affid. 1 6 and Ex. 2; R.
397-398, Affid. % 4.)

The contract provided in its last paragraph

as follows:
It is understood that the stipulations aforesaid are to
apply to and bind the heirs, executors, administrators,
successors and assigns of the respective parties hereto.
[R. 386, Affid. Ex. 2.]
In the spring or summer of 1985, Dee Henshaw contacted Irene
Sweeney and told her there was a problem with the title of part of
the property that was the subject of the May 27, 1976 contract of
sale.

(R. 398, Affid. % 5.)

This was the first communication

Sweeney received regarding any problem with the title to the

1

The District Court denied Henshaw's Motion to strike
portions of the Affidavit of Max M. Williams (R.590); reasons for
denial of the Motion are supplied in UDOT's Memorandum in
Opposition to the Motion to Strike (R. 502-506).
4

property UDOT had transferred to her and which she had contracted
to sell to Henshaw,

(R. 398, Affid. 1 6.)

Sweeney thereupon complained to UDOT about the state of the
title and began to work with UDOT to resolve the problem. Henshaw
knew then of UDOT's involvement inasmuch as Henshaw himself states
that in "late August or early September, 1985, Sweeney began to
refuse to talk to me about the property and would only say she was
working with UDOT to resolve the problems."

(R. 114-115, Affid.

Henshaw, 1 7). 2
UDOT satisfied Sweeney's complaint about the state of the
title by purchasing back Sweeney's interest in the property by
assignment on November 21, 1985 (R. 379, 388-390, Affid. and Ex.
3) , and the assignment was recorded with the Salt Lake County
Recorder on December 12, 1985.

(R. 390.)

On October 9, 1985, Sweeney had prepared a memorandum to
Henshaw in which she stated as follows:

"I am in the process of

selling off the Real Estate contract I have with you for the
purchase of some of my land. It is being purchased by the State of
Utah."

This memorandum communicates, among other things, that the

2

Henshaw also states that when he asked Sweeney why "she would
no longer accept monthly payments," Sweeney said "she was working
with UDOT to resolve problems with the property, so she could give
a warranty deed to the property." (R. 114, Affid. Henshaw, % 6).
Henshaw further states that in July of 1985 he knew Sweeney was
"having her attorney work it out with UDOT where she had acquired
title to the property" (R. 115, Affid. Henshaw, % 9), and that
Sweeney was stonewalling him beginning in July, 1985. (R. 454-455,
Affid. Henshaw, % 26) .

5

"closing should take place within two weeks," and directs Henshaw
to two named UDOT employees.

(R. 398, 400, Affid. 1 7 and Ex. 1.)

On or about the date of the memorandum referred to in the preceding
paragraph, and in any event by October 10, 1985,

Sweeney mailed

the memorandum to Henshaw in St. George, Utah, to the address he
had given her for correspondence and which he had written on mail
he sent to her.

(R. 398, 534, Affid. 11 7 and 8 and Affid. 1 5)

(clarifying the date Sweeney mailed the memorandum)).
Despite the actual and constructive knowledge Henshaw had in
1985 of UDOT's involvement in working out the problems with the
title and Sweeney's refusal to deal with him, Henshaw claims he
repeatedly tendered the remaining purchase price to Sweeney from
June 1985 through March 1986,3 without ever making any inquiry of
UDOT about the matter.
On December 12, 1986, Dee Henshaw assigned his interest in the
contract of sale originally between Sweeney and Henshaw, to Melvin
L. Henshaw and Barbara S. Henshaw, and recorded the document of
assignment on the same day.
4.)

(R. 379, 391-392, Affid. 1 9 and Ex.

Not until August 26, 1991, did Melvin L. Henshaw and Barbara

S. Henshaw assign back to Dee Henshaw their interest in the
contract.

(R. 380, 393-394, Affid. 1 10 and Ex. 5.)

UDOT

maintains that Henshaw's lack of any legal interest in the property
during the 1986-1991 period undermines Henshaw's contentions that
3

R. 308, 316, 319, Second Amended Complaint, 11 15, 60, 84;
R. 433, Plaintiff's Statement of Undisputed Fact, 1 8.
6

he had a right of possession during that time and that his right of
possession was breached in 1988.
On October 8, 1986, Proctors (who, it turned out, had an
interest in the property) conveyed by warranty deed to UDOT
property included in the property on which Henshaw bases his
Complaint.

UDOT had first become aware in 1985 of Proctor's

interest in this property that was part of the property UDOT
conveyed to Sweeney in 1973 and then repurchased from her in 1985.
The Proctor deed to UDOT was recorded at Book 5858, page 2217 on
December 30, 1986.

(R. 380, 395, Affid. 1 11 and Ex. 6.)

This

conveyance and recordation cured any title defect attributable to
Proctor's interest.
In 1988 Salt Lake County contacted Mr. Williams by telephone
at UDOT offices and stated that certain property was shown on plat
maps as belonging to UDOT, that there was a flood emergency on that
property, and that the County needed to go onto the property to
address the flood problems.

(R. 380, Affid. % 12.)

This is the

property Plaintiff refers to in his second and third causes of
action.

Mr. Williams assumed the statements of the County as to

UDOT's ownership and the County's need were correct. However, UDOT
did not direct the County to do the County's flood control work and
UDOT took no part in the flood control operation.
1 13.)

(R. 380, Affid.

These facts support UDOT's position that UDOT took no

action constituting breach of any covenant of quiet possession.

7

In 1991 UDOT became aware of a claim of interest of other
parties in the property UDOT repurchased from Sweeney in 1985, and
UDOT purchased that interest from the claiming parties, Richard and
Lois Brady, through six deeds executed in June and July of 1991,
all of which were recorded on July 16, 1991.
15 J

(R. 381, Affid. %

Henshaw provided no evidentiary proffer to the contrary.

This purchase and recordation cured any title defect attributable
to the Brady's interest.
On August 28, 1991, UDOT conveyed to Henshaw by warranty deed
the entire property regarding which Plaintiff made his claims. (R.
381, 396, Affid. 1 16 and Ex. 7.)
Plaintiff has not filed a notice of claim with the State or
the Utah Attorney General's office for any injury claimed in this
action.

(R. 362-363, UDOT

Memorandum.)

FACTS,

1

1; R,

438, Henshaw's

The original complaint was filed February 6, 1992.

(R. 2.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The District Court correctly ruled that all of Plaintiff's
causes of action failed to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted. Henshaw stipulated that the third cause of action for an
alleged taking fails to state a claim. The contract claims (counts
I, II, and IV) fail to state a claim because the undisputed facts
demonstrate merger of the contract in the warranty deed UDOT
delivered to Henshaw on August 28, 1991, and discharge by UDOT's
8

performance or accord and satisfaction through UDOT's delivery of
the deed, for less than the contract price, and by Henshaw's own
actions.
The contract claim asserted in the second cause of action -for breach of a covenant of quiet possession -- fails to state a
claim for the additional reasons that Henshaw had no rights of any
kind in the property at the time of the asserted breach and hence
no right of possession, having assigned his interest away.

That

contract claim also fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted because UDOT did not direct or have any part in the Salt
Lake County flood control operation Henshaw contends breached the
covenant of quiet possession.
The fraud claim (Count V) fails to state a claim because it is
barred by the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.
All of the claims are time barred.

The contract claims are

barred because they accrued, if at all, in July 1985, the time of
the asserted breach of UDOT's assignor, Sweeney.

They were also

barred at the time of the assignment of the contract to UDOT
(November 21, 1985) or, at the latest, when Henshaw first learned
or should have learned of the assignment to UDOT, which was in
1985.

Even the latest of these times was more than six years

earlier than the filing of the complaint on February 6, 1992, and
thus the contract claims are time-barred by the six-year statute of
limitations.

9

The Fraud claim is barred by the one-year notice of claim
requirement of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act and by the threeyear general limitation on fraud actions.
ARGUMENT
I
THE DISTRICT COURT'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OP UDOT
SHOULD BE AFFIRMED BECAUSE THERE IS NO GENUINE DISPUTE AS
TO ANY MATERIAL ISSUE OF FACT AND BECAUSE THE FACTS AS
CONTENDED BY APPELLANT ENTITLE UDOT TO JUDGMENT AS A
MATTER OF LAW.
Plaintiff claims disputed facts.
himself

stated

and

other

undisputed

However, facts Appellant
facts

entitle

UDOT

to

affirmance as a matter of law. See Hunt v. ESI Engineering, Inc.,
808 P.2d

1137, 1139

(Utah Ct. App. 1988)

(affirming summary

judgment); Themv v. Seagull Enterprises, Inc., 595 P.2d 526, 529
(Utah 1979) (affirming summary judgment).
parsed

and

applied

below

to

each

of

These facts will be
Appellant's

claims

individually.
Appellant's remaining assertions are not "genuine issues of
material

fact" as Appellant

claims.

Many of them have no

evidentiary basis in the record, they are not material to the
defenses raised, and they do not preclude summary judgment in
UDOT's favor under Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
"If

[disputed facts] would not establish a basis upon which

plaintiff could recover, no matter how they were resolved, it would
be useless to consume time, effort and expense in trying them, the
saving of which is the very purpose of summary judgment procedure."
10

Abdulkadir v. Western Pacific Railroad Co.. 7 Utah 2d 53, 55, 318
P.2d 339, 341 (1957). See also Hecrlar Ranch, Inc. v. Stillman, 619
P.2d 1390, 1391 (Utah 1980) (summary judgment is not precluded
"simply whenever some fact remains in dispute, but only when a
material fact is genuinely controverted").
Undisputed
District

facts properly made of

record

compelled

the

Court to grant UDOT's motion for Summary Judgment.

Application of the law to those same facts requires affirmance
here.
II
THE DISTRICT COURT'S SUMMARY .JUDGMENT ON THE GROUNDS THE
COMPLAINT FAILED TO STATE A CLAIM SHOULD BE AFFIRMED.
The District Court's summary judgment was rendered under Rule
56 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, and not under Rule 52
as Appellant suggests. In its motion and memorandum UDOT "move[d]
the court for summary judgment against Plaintiff on all causes of
action" (R. 360) and urged that " [a]11 of Plaintiff's causes of
action fail to state a claim."
supplied reasons in support.

(R. 516.)

UDOT's memoranda

Subsequently, the District Court

granted UDOT's motion for the reasons stated in UDOT's supporting
memoranda. Even if the District Court had not stated its grounds,
which it did by reference, affirmance by this Court is proper
inasmuch as it "may affirm a grant of summary judgment on any
ground available to the trial court, even if it is one not relied

11

on below."

Hiaains v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 235 (Utah

1993) .
Henshaw stipulated that his third cause of action "may be
dismissed" because Plaintiff had not filed a notice of claim as
required by the Utah Governmental Immunity Act (R. 438) . Therefore
the third cause of action was dismissed upon stipulation.
A.

Any Real Property Aspect of the First Cause of
Action Fails to State a Claim

To the extent the first cause is a real property action, it is
barred by the claim requirement of Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-12
(1993), a section of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.4
B.

The Second Cause of Action Fails to State a Claim

The second cause of action is confusingly asserted to include
a real property claim. Henshaw stated at page 8 of his Memorandum
that the claim arises from "an equitable interest in property."
(R. 436.)

To any extent it is a property claim, it is barred by

the claim requirement of Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-12 (1993).
In any event, the second cause of action, for breach of a
covenant of quiet possession, fails to state a claim because
Appellant had no rights of any kind in the property, contract or
otherwise, at the time of the asserted breach in 1988. Henshaw had

4

Appellant incorrectly states that UDOT falsely asserts that
Mr. Henshaw's First Cause of Action is based on the implied covenant of a Warranty deed. Appellant's Brief at 24. In its memorandum UDOT stated: "However, the basis of Plaintiff's claim is not
a warranty deed, but a contract to sell property."
(R. 397.)
(Emphasis in original.)
12

assigned his interest to another party in 1986 and did not receive
the assignment back until 1991.
5).

(R. 391-394, Affid., Exs. 4 and

Manifestly, Appellant cannot assert any breach of a covenant

of quiet enjoyment or possession that may have occurred at a time
when he had no right of possession, and therefore the second cause
of action fails to state a claim.
Moreover, UDOT

did nothing

that

could

be

construed

as

breaching any covenant of quiet possession regarding the property.
What happened is stated in the Affidavit of Max M. Williams without
contravention.

In 1988 Salt Lake County contacted Mr. Williams by

telephone at UDOT offices and stated that certain property was
shown on plat maps as belonging to UDOT, that there was a flood
emergency on that property, and that the County needed to go onto
the property to address the flood problems.

(R. 380, Affid. % 12.)

Mr. Williams assumed the statements of the County as to UDOT's
ownership and the County's need were correct. Dispositively, UDOT
did not direct the County to do its flood control work and UDOT
took no part in the flood control operation.

(R. 380, Affid. H

13.)
C.

All of Plaintiff's Contract Claims (Counts I,
II, and IV) Fail to State a Claim Because the
Undisputed Facts Demonstrate Merger of the
Contract in the Warranty Deed and Discharge by
UDOT's Performance or Accord and Satisfaction
and by Appellant's Own Actions.

Henshaw's wildly vacillating descriptions of counts I, II and
IV as, variously, express contract, implied contract, real property
13

and,

if

one

reads

the

counts

themselves,

fraudulent

representations, show that Appellant himself does not know what
kind of claim he is asserting in those counts. As already shown,
if they are property

claims, they

fail to comply with the

Governmental Immunity Act, and Appellant has cited no authority to
show they are cognizable claims in implied contract or fraud. The
only remaining option is that all three claims sometimes described
by Henshaw as contract claims are based on the contract's provision
requiring the seller to supply a warranty deed and title insurance.
This is the claim that reappears through Henshaw's complaint and
memorandum.
However, Henshaw's claim that he was ready to perform and UDOT
was not is irrelevant for the period December 12, 1986, through
August 26, 1991, inasmuch as Plaintiff had no interest in the
contract or property at that time, having assigned it away.
391-394,

Affid.,

Exs.

4

and

5;

R.

acknowledgement he had assigned it away).)

488-489

(R.

(Henshaw's

Moreover, the alleged

documents Henshaw submitted, and the transcripts he submitted as
Exhibits G through K to the Henshaw Affidavit
actually undercut Appellant's position.

(R. 457-493),

Henshaw cannot claim the

benefit of any of his other inconsistent statements.

Kinyon v.

Cardon. 686 P.2d 1048, 1052, n. 3 (Or. 1984).
Apart from Henshaw's shocking breach of ethics in recording
telephone conversations without first informing the other parties

14

he was doing so,5 the transcripts show negotiations that culminated
in Henshaw receiving in settlement exactly what he requested.
Moreover, he paid a lower price than the original contract
required.6

Thus, there was no actionable breach at all.

The

transcripts show good faith discussion regarding, among other
things, whether UDOT could properly deal with Henshaw directly in
light of his representation by counsel (Exs. H - November 10, 1986;
I - December 12, 1986; J - January 5, 1987; and K - January 6,
1987), the exact amount of the payoff (Exs. G - November 19, 1986;
and H - November 20, 1986), and whether UDOT would pay Henshaw's
attorneys fees, which UDOT did (Ex. K - January 6, 1987) . (R. 457493.)
They also show negotiation regarding whether a quit-claim deed
or warranty deed would be passed ( R. 486-490, Ex. K - January 6,
1987).

Significantly, Henshaw had no interest in the contract at

the time of these negotiations. UDOT's practice has always been to
convey property by quit-claim deed, as the original Order of
Condemnation and the transcript confirm, and it is true that UDOT
officials were at first reluctant to use a warranty deed. However,
upon eventual
5

mutual

agreement

and

settlement

regarding

the

(R. 537-538, Affid. 1 10.)

6

"In our closing meeting with Mr. Henshaw on August 28, 1991,
at which I was present, UDOT reduced the purchase price of the
property UDOT was selling to Henshaw below the contractual amount,
received from Mr. Henshaw the amount of $4,269.20, and delivered to
Mr. Henshaw the executed warranty deed on the property." (R. 537,
Affid. 1 5.)
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numerous elements of the negotiation, UDOT conveyed the property to
Henshaw by warranty deed just two days after Henshaw reacquired his
interest in the contract on August 26, 1991.

(R. 393, 394, 396,

Affid., Exs. 5 and 7.)
When UDOT executed and delivered to Henshaw the Warranty Deed
conveying the property in question, all provisions of the prior
contract merged in the deed, and any claim Henshaw had on the
contract was extinguished.

The rule is stated in Utah case law as

follows:
Ordinarily when a deed is given in full
execution of a contract of sale of land, all
provisions of the prior contract are merged
therein; and when the merger is denied by a
party, the burden is upon him to show to the
contrary by clear and convincing evidence.
Rasmussen v. Olsen, 583 P.2d 50, 53

(Utah 1978)

(reversing a

judgment so as to recognize that a prior contract was merged in the
deed); see also, Kelsey v. Hansen, 18 Utah 2d 226, 419 P.2d 198
(1966) (holding that "a merger resulted" when the seller supplied
to the buyer a deed, and that the warranty deed abrogated the
preexisting contractual agreement); see generally. 26 C.J.S. Deeds
§ 91.c. (1956) .
The barring of claims for damages under a preexisting contract
that has been merged in a subsequent deed is precisely what the
doctrine of merger accomplished, merger being a doctrine of repose,
simplification, and clarification.

The term used to indicate the

effect of merger on the preexisting contract is "abrogate.ff Kelsey
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v. Hansen, 18 Utah 2d 226, 419 P.2d

198

(1966).

The only

definitions of "abrogate" supplied in Webster's New Collegiate
Dictionary (1976) are:

"to abolish by authoritative action," and

"to do away with." The only rational meaning of that word in this
context is that as a result of the merger, the contract has no
further legal existence. Without any legal existence, the contract
cannot contain any binding term, and without any binding term, no
damages can flow. No contract, no contractual term, no breach, no
damages.
To escape the merger doctrine Henshaw would have to show a
specific agreement by UDOT to continue the life of the preexisting
contract.

This he has not done, nor could he do so because there

is no such agreement.

If Appellant harbored grievances, he could

have demanded terms to protect them in the deed.

This he did not

do.
Appellant bore the burden "to show ... by clear and convincing
evidence" that merger did not occur. Rasmussen v. Olsen. 583 P.2d
50, 53 (Utah 1978).

Yet he tendered no evidence at all to rebut

the ordinary understanding that the deed extinguishes the contract.
Merger operates here to bar any claim Henshaw may assert from the
now legally non-existent contract.
Further, under the undisputed facts recited, Appellant's
contract claims are barred by UDOT's performance. Where a contract
has "been performed by both parties [it] is terminated and cannot
be the basis of [an] action" for breach.
17

Morgan Drive Away, Inc.

v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters. Chauffeurs, Warehousemen
and Helpers of America, 166 F. Supp. 885 (S. D. Ind. 1958) affirmed
268 F. 2d 871 (1959), cert, denied 361 U. S. 896 (1959).
UDOT'S conveyance for less than the contract price also
entitles UDOT to the defense of accord and satisfaction.

The

doctrine is stated as follows:
Accord and satisfaction arises where the parties to
an agreement resolve that a given performance by one
party thereto, offered in substitution of the performance
originally agreed upon, will discharge the obligation
created under the original agreement. Essential to its
validity are, (1) a proper subject matter; (2) competent
parties; (3) an assent or meeting of the minds of the
parties; and (4) a consideration given for the accord.
Suaarhouse Finance Company v. Anderson, 610 P. 2d 1369 (Utah
1980)

(affirming the grant of a motion based on accord and

satisfaction).

See also. Farmland Service Coop., Inc. v. Jack 242

N. W, 2d 624, 625 (Neb. 1976) ("An executed compromise settlement
of a good faith controversy is an accord and satisfaction"). Here,
the settlement of the matter between UDOT and Henshaw by UDOT'S
delivery and Henshaw's acceptance of the warranty deed, for a price
less than that required by the contract,7 discharged the contract
by accord and satisfaction.
As to Henshaw's claim that UDOT breached the contract by
failing to obtain title insurance in Appellant's name, it was only
circumstances created by Appellant himself that prevented UDOT from
obtaining title insurance in Appellant's name.
7

R. 537, Affid. % 5.
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That is, because

Henshaw had not recorded the warranty deed UDOT executed in his
favor# title companies could not insure the property in Henshaw's
name.

To protect the property, UDOT obtained title insurance in

its own name, since UDOT was still the record owner, and UDOT was
at all times prepared to have the insurance placed in Henshaw's
name if Henshaw would record the deed and so inform UDOT, as UDOT
advised him to do.
A.)

(R. 537, 539-545, Affid. M

This is undisputed.

7, 8 and 9 and Ex.

UDOT did all it could do regarding the

title insurance, and "no one [Henshaw in this case] can avail
himself of the non-performance of a condition precedent, who has
himself occasioned its non-performance." Cannon v. Stevens School
of Business, Inc. , 560 P.2d 1383, 1385 (Utah 1977) . See also. Reed
v. Alvey, 610 P.2d 1374, 1379 (1980); Haymore v. Levinson, 328 P.2d
307, 310, 8 Utah 2d 66, 70 (1958).
In sum, the undisputed facts show that UDOT's responsibilities
under the contract were discharged by merger of the contract into
the deed, UDOT's performance or accord and satisfaction and by
Appellant's own conduct, as a matter of law.
D.

The Fifth Cause of Action Fails to State a
Claim Because It Is Barred bv the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act

The fifth cause of action is for an alleged conspiracy to
defraud. Such a cause fails to state a claim unless it is preceded
by a notice of claim as required by Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-12
(1989).

Here, it is undisputed that Appellant has not filed a

notice of claim against the State under Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-12
19

(1989),

(R. 362-363, UDOT

Memorandum.)

FACTS, % 1; R.

438, Henshaw's

Section 63-30-12 provides that the claim must be

filed "regardless of whether or not the function giving rise to the
claim is characterized as governmental."
Further, under Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3, UDOT as a State
entity is immune from suit for any exercise of a governmental
function, and indeed for "all governmental acts,"8 not specifically
exempted from the Act.
(Utah Sup. Ct. 1995).

See DeBry v. Noble, 257 Utah Adv. Rep. 3
UDOT's purchase of the contract from Sweeny

was a "governmental function" related to and necessitated by UDOT's
condemnation of certain property of Sweeney's for which UDOT traded
a portion of the property in issue. The key to UDOT's involvement
was the Condemnation Order of 1973.

(R. 383-385, Affid., Ex. 1.)

The Order provides that the "Plaintiff [State of Utah] did satisfy
said judgment to the Defendant Irene C. Sweeney, by an exchange of
surplus property by quit-claim deed designated as Parcel 138B:23:STQ."

When Henshaw told Sweeney someone else "was claiming

ownership of one of the lots and asked her if she had clear

8

If, as Henshaw claims, the fraud action arose in 1994, that
action is all the more clearly barred by the amendment in 1987 of
§ 63-30-2 (4) (a) of the Governmental Immunity Act "which vastly
expanded the term 'governmental function' and therefore the scope
of governmental immunity by making all government acts subject to
immunity, regardless of whether the actions were deemed 'essential'
'core,' or 'uniquely governmental' activities." Debry v. Noble,
257 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 6 (Utah Sup. Ct. 1995).
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title,"9

Sweeney

informed UDOT and UDOT

confirmed

a title

problem,10 UDOT purchased Sweeney's interest.
Sweeney contended she had a claim against the State, and there
was color of legal claim and proper governmental interest that the
State not obtain Sweeney's property without just compensation.
UDOT's purchase of the property from Sweeney was a governmental
function and a government act stemming from the 1973 condemnation,
and UDOT is immune under Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3 from the claims
of the fifth cause of action challenging the purchase.
Also, under Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(6) (1993), immunity of
a governmental entity for injury that "arises out of . . .

a

misrepresentation by the employee whether or not it is negligent or
intentional" is specifically not waived. Thus, the fifth cause is
barred by the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.11
9

R. 430, Plaintiff's Memorandum -- Statement of Disputed
Facts, 11 4 and 5.
10

R. 364, 365, 378-396, UDOT's opening Memorandum -- UDOT
FACTS, 11's 9 and 13 and Affidavit.
11

Even if Plaintiff had stated a claim, the fifth cause would
be subject to dismissal for non-compliance with Rule 9 of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure that requires the circumstances
constituting fraud to be stated with particularity. Utah R. Civ.
P. 9(b) (1991). While Plaintiff has generally alleged that UDOT
"attempted" to deceive the Plaintiff to take a quit claim deed
(though in fact UDOT actually conveyed a warranty deed) no other
particulars are alleged with respect to these asserted
misrepresentations. (R. at 321, Second Amended Complaint, 1 95.)
An allegation of fraud must do more than refer to an "attempt" and,
at a minimum, must supply specificity as to time, content of the
alleged
misrepresentations,
method
of
communicating
the
misrepresentations, and place. See e.g., Debrv v. Noble, 257 Utah
Adv. Rep. 3, 6 (Utah Sup. Ct. 1995); Cook v. Zion's First National
21

Ill
ALL OF PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS ARE TIME-BARRED
A.

The Breach of Contract Claims of the First,
Second and Fourth Causes of Action Are Timebarred bv the Six Year Statute of Limitations
on Written Obligations.

There

is

only

one

contract

here,

and

the

statute

of

limitations began to run upon the first breach regardless of
whether the contract was also later breached.

Butcher v. Gilrov,

744 P.2d 311 (Utah App. 1987) . Thus# Plaintiff's separation of his
contract claims into three causes is artificial and meaningless for
purposes of determining when the statute began to run.
Plaintiff alleges interactions with Sweeney and actions and
non-actions of UDOT that determine when UDOT's alleged breach first
occurred. The Second Amended Complaint alleges in part as follows:
Beginning in June of 1985, and through March
of 1986, the Plaintiff repeatedly tendered to
Sweeney the remainder of the purchase price due on
the property specified in Exhibit No. 1. [R. 308,
316, 319, Second Amended Complaint, 11 15, 60 and
84.]
On or about November 21, 1985, unbeknownst to
the Plaintiff, Defendant Sweeney assigned her
interest in the Uniform Real Estate contract
evidenced by Exhibit No. 1 to UDOT. [R. 308, 316,
320, Amended Complaint, 11 18, 63, 87.]
From July 1985, through March 1986, Sweeney
would not accept payments on the property from the
Plaintiff.
[R. 308, 316, 320, Second Amended
Complaint, 11 17, 64 and 86.]

Bank, 645 F.Supp. 423, 425 (D. Utah 1986).
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These allegations reflect Plaintiff's awareness of Sweeney's
alleged breach of contract no later than July of 1985.

Plaintiff

knew at that time that Sweeney had not accepted his tenders, and
that she had not delivered a warranty deed and title insurance.
The cause of action arose no later than at that point and was
barred as to Sweeney six years later (in 1991), approximately six
months

before

the

action was

filed

on

February

6, 1992.

Essentially on this basis the Court dismissed the contract action
against Sweeney.
The allegations also acknowledge that on November 21, 1985,
Sweeney assigned the contract to UDOT.

(R. 308, 316, 320, Second

Amended Complaint, %% 18, 63 and 87.)

With regard to assignment,

the contract provides in its last paragraph as follows:
It is understood that the stipulations aforesaid
are to apply to and bind the heirs, executors,
administrators, successors, and assigns of the
respective parties hereto. [R. 386, Affid., Ex. 2
(emphasis supplied).]
Henshaw asserts that under this clause UDOT succeeds to
Sweeney's liabilities to Henshaw. But though Henshaw is willing to
have UDOT assume Sweeney's liabilities, he objects to UDOT's
assumption of Sweeney's statute of limitations defense. A clause
in a contract extending stipulations of the contract to an assign
or successor eliminates the necessity of express acquisition of
rights and liabilities, and under such a clause an assignee
automatically stands in the shoes of the assignor.

Citizens

Surburban Co. v. Rosemount Development Co., 53 Cal. Rptr. 551, 244
23

Cal. App. 2d 666 (1966).

See also Arkansas Amusement Corp. v.

Kemper, 57 F.2d 466, 467 (8th Cir. 1932).

Thus, UDOT succeeds to

the initial alleged breach of Sweeney in July of 1985, and UDOT
succeeds to the statute of limitations defenses of Sweeney.
If it were not true that an assignee succeeds to the rights
and liabilities of the assignor, Henshaw would not have succeeded
to any cause of action Henshaw's assignors had when they assigned
the contract to Henshaw on August 26, 1991. Under such a scenario,
Henshaw's rights under the contract began on August 26, 1991 and
were promptly satisfied when he was presented with a warranty deed
two days later on August

28, 1991, no breach

of Henshaw's

contractual rights having occurred at all. Henshaw cannot have it
both ways -- that he succeeds to his assignor's rights but not to
defenses against those rights.

And he cannot say that UDOT

succeeds to UDOT's assignor's liabilities (the original alleged
breach of the one and only contract) but not to UDOT's assignor's
statute of limitations defenses.
The contract breach Henshaw asserts against UDOT is the same
breach he asserted against UDOT's assignor -- failure to timely
convey a warranty deed and purchase title insurance.

It is not

reasonable to conclude that Henshaw acquired the right to sue UDOT
on that breach, through the assignment, without also acquiring the
duty of timely diligence in filing an action on it within the time
fixed by the statute of limitations.
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Appellant claims he did not know of the assignment until March
of 1986 and therefore could not make his demand on UDOT until that
time,

(R. 308, 310, 311, 316, Second Amended Complaint, 11 18, 29,

36 and 63),

However, any cause of action for breach of UDOT's

contractual obligation's accrued when the alleged breach first
occurred, i.e., under the general rule, when Sweeney's breach
occurred, or liberally, when UDOT took the assignment on November
21, 1985 allegedly without informing Plaintiff of it.

Becton

Dickinson and Co. v. Reese, 668 P.2d 1254, 1257 (Utah 1983) ("mere
ignorance of the existence of a cause of action does not prevent
the running of the statute of limitations") (quoting from a prior
case).
Even under the

"discovery rule," applied

in exceptional

circumstances, a cause of action accrues when a claimant, in the
exercise of reasonable diligence, should learn of the existence of
his claim.

See, e.g., Becton Dickinson and Co. v. Reese, at 1257;

Campbell v. Loftus. 676 P.2d

1025, 1027

(Wash. 1984).

Here,

Henshaw knew or should have known of the assignment to UDOT in
1985.

The Affidavit of Irene Sweeney

(R. 397-400), and the

clarifying Supplemental Affidavit of Irene Sweeney (R. 533-539),
establish that Sweeney sent the memorandum conveying her intention
to assign the contract to UDOT to Henshaw at the address he
provided her, "on or about," October 9, 1985 and no later than
October 10, 1985. And she stated that the assignment would occur
within two weeks.

Henshaw's evidence does not dispute this.
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Further, Henshaw knew that UDOT was involved in attempting to
resolve the title problems with the property in late August or
early September, 1985:
In late August or early September, 1985,
Sweeney began to refuse to talk to me about the
property and would only say that she was working
with UDOT to resolve the problems[R. 114-115,
Affid. 1 7.]
I contacted Sweeney numerous times to get the
payoff figure, however, she never provided me with
a payoff figure, and she stated that she would no
longer accept the monthly payments. When I asked
why, Sweeney stated that she was working with her
attorney and with UDOT to resolve problems with the
property, so that she could give me a warranty deed
to the property.
[R. 114, Affid. 1 6 (emphasis
supplied) . ] 1 2
Also according to Henshaw, Henshaw knew that in July of 1985
Sweeney was "having her attorney work it out with UDOT where she
had acquired title to the property" (R. 115, Affid. Henshaw, 1 9) ,
and Sweeney stonewalled Henshaw beginning in July, 1985.

(R. 454-

455, Affid. 1 26).
Significantly, UDOT recorded the assignment from Sweeney on
December 12, 1985.

(R. 390, Affid., Ex. 3.)

In view of Henshaw's

awareness in 1985 of Sweeney and UDOT working to resolve the
problems with the title, just before and during the time-period of
the assignment and recordation, the recordation supplied far more
than

the

usual

"constructive"

12

knowledge

given

by

document

In fact, it was Henshaw himself, in 1985, who first informed
Sweeney that there were title problems with the property. (R. 398,
Affid. 11 5 and 6.)
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recordation and sufficient to supply notice.13

Despite all these

facts, Henshaw does not claim to have made any inquiry of UDOT in
1985 (or before March of 1986) regarding UDOT's position with
regard to the property

In short, Henshaw learned or should have

learned in 1985 (or before February 6, 1986) that Sweeney had
assigned the contract to UDOT.
These

undisputed

facts

and

circumstances

coupled

with

Henshaw's claims that " [beginning in June of 1985 and through March
of 1986, the Plaintiff repeatedly tendered to Sweeney the remainder
of the purchase price",14 require Plaintiff's alleged .demands on
Sweeney to be taken as demands on UDOT.

Henshaw cannot enjoy the

benefit of claiming a breach by the obligor (Sweeney and UDOT) and
at the same time avoid the bar of the statute of limitations, by
making demands creating the breach not on a party he knows or
should know is a current obligor (UDOT) , but on a prior obligor
(Sweeney). Again, "no one can avail himself of the non-performance
of a condition precedent, who has himself occasioned its non-

13

In McConkie v. Hartman. 529 P.2d 801 (Utah 1974), the Utah
Supreme Court affirmed a judgment that an action under a real
estate contract and for fraud was time-barred. The Court upheld
findings of the lower court that "all of the circumstances existing
at or about the time the deeds were recorded were such as to
furnish full opportunity to the plaintiffs for the discovery of the
mistake or fraud, if any existed [,and] that more than eight years
had elapsed since the time for reasonable inquiry on the part of
the plaintiff would have revealed the mistake or fraud to the time
of filing their complaint". Id. at 802.
14

R. 308, 316, 319, Second Amended Complaint, 11 15, 60, 84;
see also R. 433, Plaintiff's Statement of Undisputed Fact, 1 8.
27

performance." Cannon v. Stevens School of Business, Inc., 560 P.2d
1383, 1385 (Utah 1977).
The statute of limitations on Plaintiff's contract-claims
against UDOT accrued at the time of Sweeney's breach, or possibly
at the time of the assignment of the contract to UDOT on November
21, 1985.

At the latest, the statute began to run when Henshaw

first learned or should have learned of the assignment, which was
in 1985. Thus, any contract claims of the first, second and fourth
causes of action filed more than six years later on February 6,
1992, are barred by the six-year statute.15
B.

The Fraudulent Conspiracy Claim of the Fifth Cause of
Action is Time-barred by the Governmental Immunity Act
and by the General Three-year Rule.

The fifth cause of action for conspiracy to defraud is timebarred under the one-year rule of Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-12 (1989),
inasmuch as no notice of claim was filed within one year (or at
all) after Henshaw first knew or should have known of the alleged
fraud, as shown above in argument III A, and was not filed within
one year of the time even Henshaw asserts he was informed in March
of 1986 by UDOT of the assignment of the contract to UDOT and was

15

The fact that Defendants allegedly continued to violate the
contract and to refuse Plaintiff's subsequent tenders is
irrelevant, as the Court ruled in dismissing the claims against
Sweeney, since the statute commenced to run when the cause of
action accrued. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-1 (1991); Davidson
Lumber Sales, Inc. v. Bonneville Investment, Inc., 794 P.2d 11, 19
(Utah 1990) .
The fact that the breach allegedly continued
thereafter does not extend or toll the statute of limitations as
such a construction would create a perpetual limitations period.
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aware of UDOT's alleged refusals.
Amended Complaint, M

(R. 308, 310, 311, 316, Second

18, 29, 36 and 63 (Henshaw's allegations

regarding learning of the assignment in March of 1986)).
The supposed new fact Plaintiff now "finds" in Defendants'
1994 answer to Defendant's Second Amended Complaint -- that UDOT
apparently deeded only a right-of-way to Sweeney in 1983 -- is
transparently immaterial.16

The salient feature of Plaintiff's

claim that the title was defective is just that -- that the title
was defective.

Whether the defect took the form of a transfer of

a right-of-way rather than a fee because UDOT was unaware of the
extent of the title, or took some other form, is immaterial. What
is material is that Plaintiff knew of title defects in 1985 when he
himself told Sweeney someone else was claiming an interest in the
property and he was aware Sweeney was working with UDOT to resolve
the problems with the property so he could be transferred a
warranty deed.17

Plaintiff's Fifth Cause of Action alleging a

16

The deed UDOT and Sweeney both thought transferred fee title
in 1973 shows on its face that it is for a fee interest. (R. 535,
Affid., Ex. A.) That it was reasonable to think title was clear is
underscored by Henshaw's acknowledgement that "nothing in fact ever
showed up on" the several title reports he had obtained. (R. 491.)
Also, Henshaw incorrectly states or implies that UDOT did not
supply a copy of this deed in connection with its motion for
summary judgment. (Henshaw's Brief, 21.)
17

UDOT went the extra mile in clearing up any title problems
by purchasing the Proctor claim in 1986 (Affid., Ex. 6), taking
back the property from Sweeney, and later, when it first became
aware in 1991 of the Brady claim (Affid. % 15) , purchasing that
interest also, all so Plaintiff's property interest would be
unimpaired. Henshaw's claim that UDOT knew of the Brady claim at
some earlier time is not supported by any tender of evidence.
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conspiracy between Sweeney and UDOT to defraud Plaintiff is timebarred by the one-year rule of Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-12, as well
as the three-year statute of limitations of Utah Code Ann. § 78-1226 (1992).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above the District Court's Summary
Judgment based on rulings that the complaint fails to state a claim
and is time barred should be affirmed.
DATED this ^ A - Q day of April, 1995.
JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

RALPH L.'FINLAYSON
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Assistant Attorney General
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ADDENDUM A

63-30-3. Immunity of governmental entities from suit
(1) Except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter, all governmental
entities are immunefromsuit for any injury which resultsfromthe exercise
of a governmental function, governmentally-owned hospital, nursing home, or
other governmental health care facility, andfroman approved medical, nursing, or other professional health care clinical training program conducted in
either public or private facilities.
(2) (a) For the purposes of this chapter only, the following state medical
programs and services performed at a state-owned university hospital are
unique or essential to the core of governmental activity in this state and
are considered to be governmental functions:
(i) care of a patient referred by another hospital or physician because of the high risk nature of the patient's medical condition;
(ii) high risk care or procedures available in Utah only at a stateowned university hospital or provided in Utah only by physicians
employed at a state-owned university acting in the scope of their
employment;
(iii) care of patients who cannot receive appropriate medical care
or treatment at another medical facility in Utah; and
(iv) any other service or procedure performed at a state-owned university hospital or by physicians employed at a state-owned university acting in the scope of their employment that a court finds is
unique or essential to the core of governmental activity in this state,
(b) If any claim under this subsection exceeds the limits established in
Section 63-30-34, the claimant may submit the excess claim to the Board
of Examiners and the Legislature under Title 63, Chapter 6.
(3) The management of flood waters and other natural disasters and the
construction, repair, and operation of flood and storm systems by governmental entities are considered to be governmental functions, and governmental
entities and their officers and employees are immunefromsuit for any injury
or damage resulting from those activities.
(4) Officers and employees of a Children's Justice Center are immune from
suit for any iiyury which resultsfromtheir joint intergovernmental functions
at a center created in Title 62A, Chapter 4.

63-30-10. Waiver of immunity for injury caused by negligent act or omission of employee — Exceptions.
Immunityfromsuit of all governmental entities is waived for injury proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee committed
within the scope of employment except if the injury arises out of:
• • • •

(6) a misrepresentation by an employee whether or not it is negligent
or intentional;

63-30-12. Claim against state or its employee — Time for
filing notice.
A claim against the state, or against its employee for an act or omission
occurring during the performance of his duties, within the scope of employment, or under color of authority, is barred unless notice of claim isfiledwith
the attorney general and the agency concerned within one year after the claim
arises, or before the expiration of any extension of time granted under Section
63-30-11, regardless of whether or not the function giving rise to the claim is
characterized as governmental.

78-12-1. Time for commencement of actions generally.
Civil actions may be commenced only within the periods prescribed in this
chapter, after the cause of action has accrued, except in specific cases where a
different limitation is prescribed by statute.

78-12-26. Within three years.
Within three years:
(1) An action for waste, or trespass upon or injury to real property;
except that when waste or trespass is committed by means of underground works upon any mining claim, the cause of action does not accrue
until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting such
waste or trespass.
(2) An action for taking, detaining, or injuring personal property, including actions for specific recovery thereof; except that in all cases where
the subject of the action is a domestic animal usually included in the term
"livestock," which at the time of its loss has a recorded mark or brand, if
the animal strayed or was stolenfromthe true owner without the owner's
fault, the cause does not accrue until the owner has actual knowledge of
such facts as would put a reasonable man upon inquiry as to the possession of the animal by the defendant.
(3) An action for relief on the ground offraudor mistake; except that
the cause of action in such case does not accrue until the discovery by the
aggrieved party of the facts constituting the fraud or mistake.
(4) An action for a liability created by the statutes of this state, other
than for a penalty or forfeiture under the laws of this state, except where
in special cases a different limitation is prescribed by the statutes of this
state.
(5) An action to enforce liability imposed by Section 78-17-8, except
that the cause of action does not accrue until the aggrieved party knows
or reasonably should know of the harm suffered.

ADDENDUM B

Charles A. Schultz (4760)
Attorney for Plaintiff
P.O. Box 1516
Sandy, Utah 84092
Telephone: (801) 944-8804

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
—-oooOooo—
DEE HENSHAW,

:

SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT

Plaintiff,

:
:

vs.
THE UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION, a political
subdivision of the state of
Utah and Ireene Sweeney,

:
Civil No. 920900687CN
:
:

Judge: J. Dennis Frederick

Defendants.
—oooOooo—
COMES NOW, the above-named Plaintiff and complains and
alleges of the Defendants, for cause, as follows:
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
1.

The Plaintiff is presently a resident of Wayne County

State of Utah, however, at all times prior to the actions and
omissions complained of herein the Plaintiff was a resident of
Washington County, State of Utah.
2.

The Defendant, the Utah Department of Transportation

(hereinafter, n UDOT"), is a political subdivision of the State of
Utah.

3.

UDOT is amenable to suit pursuant to Utah Code

Annotated, 1953 as Amended Section 63-30-5•
4.

Pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Annotated, 1953

as Amended Section 63-30-5, the Plaintiff is not required to
comply with the provisions of Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as
Amended Sections 63-30-11, 63-30-12, 63-30-13, 63-30-14, 63-3015, or 63-30-19 before filing suit against UDOT*
5.

Ireene Sweeney is, and at all times herein pertinent

was, a resident of Salt Lake County, State of Utah*
6.

The contract that is the subject of this law suit was

entered into in Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
7.

Venue is proper in the Third District Court, subject to

the provisions of Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as Amended section
63-30-17 and 78-13-7.
8.

Jurisdiction is vested in the Third District Court of

Salt Lake County pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code
Annotated, 1953 as Amended Section 78-3-4.
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS
9.

The Plaintiff realleges the allegations set forth in

paragraphs Nos. 1 through 8 of this Complaint and incorporates
them as if fully set forth by this reference.
10.

On May 27, 1976, the Plaintiff entered into a Uniform

Real Estate Contract with Irene C. Sweeney (hereinafter,
H

Sweeneylf) for the purchase of certain real property located in

Salt Lake County, State of Utah.

11.

That Uniform Real Estate Contract was recorded in the

Salt Lake County Recorders Office in Book 4944, pages 63-65.
12.

The terms of the contract are specifically set forth in

the Uniform Sales Contract attached to this Complaint as Exhibit
No. 1., and the referenced property is more completely described
in Exhibit No. 1.
13.

Sweeney had previously been deeded the referenced

property by the Defendant UDOT.
14.

Based on the information available to the Plaintiff, it

appears that at the time UDOT deeded the referenced property to
Defendant Sweeney, UDOT did not have clear title to the property.
15.

Beginning in June of 1985, and through March of 1986,

the Plaintiff repeatedly tendered to Sweeney the remainder of the
purchase price due on the property specified in Exhibit No. 1.
16.

Initially, Sweeney negotiated with the Plaintiff to

determine the pay-off amount on the property, but beginning in
July 1985, Sweeney would no longer accept the Plaintiff's
payments on the property and would not discuss a payoff with the
Plaintiff.
17.

From July 1985, through March 1986, Sweeney would not

accept payments on the property from the Plaintiff.
18.

Unbeknownst to the Plaintiff, on or about November 21,

1985, Defendant Sweeney assigned her interest in the Uniform Real
Estate Contract evidenced by Exhibit No. 1 to UDOT.

A copy of

that assignment is attached to this Complaint as Exhibit No. 2.
19.

In March of 1986, the Plaintiff was informed by UDOT
3

that UDOT had been assigned Sweeneyfs interest in Exhibit No. 1.
20.

From March of 1986, through January the Plaintiff

tendered monthly payments specified under the terms of Exhibit
No. 1 to UDOT.

However, UDOT refused to accept any payments

until January 1987, at which time UDOT accepted eighteen months
of payments, only enough to bring the payments current.
21.

In December 1986, the Plaintiff tendered a final

payment for the property to UDOT; however, UDOT refused to accept
the final payment.
22.

Beginning in March of 1986 and continuing through

August of 1991, the Plaintiff repeatedly attempted to make a
final payment on the property to UDOT.
23.

UDOT, however refused to accept a final payment from

the Plaintiff unless:

i) the Plaintiff would accept a "Quit

Claim Deed91 from UDOT in lieu of a warranty deed, and ii) unless
the Plaintiff would sign a Release, absolving UDOT from all
liability, of any nature whatsoever, with respect to the
Plaintifffs purchase of the property.
24.

From March 1986, through August 1991, UDOT continually

refused to:
i)

abide by the terms of Exhibit No. 1,

ii)

to accept the Plaintifffs offers of payment, and

iii)

to provide the Plaintiff with a warranty deed and

property insurance as required by Exhibit No. 1.
25.

UDOT continually insisted that the Plaintiff had to

accept a quit claim deed rather than a warranty deed and that the
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Plaintiff had to sign the referenced release, releasing UDOT from
all liability with respect to the Plaintiff's purchase of the
property.
26.

As a direct and proximate result of UDOTfs failure and

refusal to honor its obligations under the express terms of
Exhibit No. 1 and UDOT's refusal to provide the Plaintiff with a
warranty deed to the property and title insurance on the
property, the Plaintiff was unable to obtain clear title to the
referenced property.
27.

As a direct and proximate result of UDOT's failure and

refusal to abide by its obligations as set forth in Exhibit No.
1, the Plaintiff was denied the use and benefit of the property.
28.

As a direct and proximate result of UDOT's failure and

refusal to abide by the obligations required of it under the
express provisions of Exhibit No. 1, the Plaintiff has been
damaged in an amount to be proven at trial.

mSTCAVW OFACTION
(Breach of Contract, "Covenant to Convey Title11)
29.

The Plaintiff realleges the allegations set forth in

paragraphs Nos. 1 through 28 of this Complaint and incorporates
them as if fully set forth by this reference.
30.

The express terms of Exhibit No. 1, require UDOT to

provide the Plaintiff with a Warranty Deed and with title
insurance when the Plaintiff has fully paid the purchase price
for the property.
31.

Beginning in March of 1986 and continuing through
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August 1991, the Plaintiff continually tendered UDOT the
remaining amount due on Exhibit No. 1; however, UDOT failed and
refused to accept the Plaintiff's payment and also failed and
refused to provide the Plaintiff with a Warranty Deed and title
insurance as required by Exhibit No. 1.
32.

From March 1986, through August 1991, UDOT failed and

refused to honor its obligation under the provisions of Exhibit
No. 1 and failed to provide the Plaintiff with Warranty Deed and
title insurance as required by Exhibit No. 1.
33.

UDOT has not yet provided the Plaintiff and/or his

assigns with tile insurance, as required by the contract.
34.

The failure and refusal of UDOT to abide by its

obligations as set forth in Exhibit No. 1, to accept the
Plaintiff's payments on the Contract, provide the Plaintiff with
a Warranty Deed and provide the Plaintiff with title insurance
constitutes breach of contract on the part of UDOT.
35.

As a direct and proximate result of UDOT's breach of

contract, the Plaintiff has been damaged in an amount to be
proven at trial.

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
(Breach of Contract/Covenant of Possession and Quiet Enjoyment")

36.

The Plaintiff realleges the allegations set forth in

paragraphs Nos. 1 through 35 of his Complaint and incorporates
them as if fully set forth by this reference.
37.

On or about November 16, 1988# UDOT, through Max
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Williams, authorized Salt Lake County Flood Control to go upon
the Plaintiffs property and construct a debris basin on the
Plaintiff's property.
38.

At the time UDOT authorized Salt Lake County Flood

Control to go upon the Plaintiff's property and construct the
referenced flood debris basin, UDOT told Salt Lake County Flood
Control that the Plaintiff did not own the property and
represented to Salt Lake County Flood Control that UDOT, not the
Plaintiff, owned the property.
39.

Acting on the representations of UDOT and over the

objections of the Plaintiff, Salt Lake County Flood Control went
upon the Plaintiff's property, destroying his gate, damaging
and/or destroying his well, removed all of the top soil from the
property and constructed a debris basin on the property.
40.

As a direct and proximate result of UDOT's fraudulent

representations, the Plaintiff's property was damaged in an
irreparable manner by Salt Lake County Flood Control.
41.

At the time UDOT made its representations to Salt Lake

County Flood Control, UDOT and/or the State of Utah owned other
property on which the debris basin could have been built.
42.

It was not necessary that the referenced basin be built

on the Plaintiff's property; if it was necessary to build a
debris basin, the debris basin could have been built somewhere
other than on the Plaintiff's property.
43.

As a direct and proximate result of UDOT's fraudulent

representations, in giving permission for construction of the
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debris basin upon the Plaintiff's property, the value and utility
of the Plaintifffs property has been diminished in an amount to
be proven at trial.
44.

UDOT's fraudulent representations that it owned the

Plaintiff's property and UDOT's improper and illegal
authorization given to Salt Lake County Flood Control, permitting
Salt Lake County Flood Control to build a debris basin on the
Plaintifffs property constitutes a breach of UDOTfs contract with
the Plaintiff, i.e., a breach of UDOTfs covenant of quiet
enjoyment to the property.
45.

As a direct and proximate result of UDOT's breach of

its Covenant of Possession and Quiet Enjoyment, the Plaintiff has
been damaged in an amount to be proven at trial.
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
(Unlawful Taking)
46.

The Plaintiff realleges the allegations set forth in

paragraphs Nos. 1 through 45 of this Complaint and incorporates
them as if fully set forth by this reference.
47.

On or about November 16, 1988, UDOT, through Max

Williams, authorized Salt Lake County Flood Control to go upon
the Plaintiff9s property and construct a debris basin on the
Plaintifffs property.
46.

At the time UDOT authorized Salt Lake County Flood

Control to go upon the Plaintifffs property and construct the
referenced flood debris basin, UDOT told Salt Lake County Flood
Control that the Plaintiff did not own the property and
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represented to Salt Lake County Flood Control that UDOT, not the
Plaintiff, owned the property,
47.

Acting on the representations of UDOT and over the

objections of the Plaintiff, Salt Lake County Flood Control went
upon the Plaintiff's property, destroying his gate, damaging
and/or destroying his well, removed all of the top soil from the
property and constructed a debris basin on the property.
48.

As a direct and proximate result of UDOT's fraudulent

representations, the Plaintiff's property was damaged in an
irreparable manner by Salt Lake County Flood Control.
49.

At the time UDOT made its representations to- Salt Lake

County Flood Control, UDOT and/or the State of Utah owned other
property on which the debris basin could have been built.
50.

At the time UDOT authorized Salt Lake County Flood

Control to enter upon the Plaintiff's property and construct the
referenced debris basin, there was no flood emergency and no
threat of any flood emergency.
51.

UDOT's unauthorized and unlawful authorization to Salt

Lake County Flood Control to enter on Plaintiff's property and
unauthorized and unlawful authorization given to Salt Lake City
Flood Control to build a debris basin on Plaintiff's property
constitutes an unlawful and impermissible taking of the
Plaintiff's property on the part of UDOT.
52.

As a direct and proximate result of UDOT's unlawful and

impermissible taking of the Plaintiff's property and the
unauthorized and unlawful authorization to Salt Lake County Flood
0

Control for the construction of the debris basin upon the
Plaintiff's property, the value and utility of the Plaintiff's
property has been diminished in an amount to be proven at trial•
53.

As a direct and proximate result of UDOT's unlawful

taking of the Plaintiff's property the Plaintiff has been damaged
in an amount to be proven at trial.
FOURTH CA USE OF ACTION
(Breach of Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing)
54.

The Plaintiff realleges the allegations set forth in

paragraphs Nos. 1 through 53 of this Complaint and incorporates
them as if fully set forth by this reference.
55.

On May 27, 1976# the Plaintiff entered into a Uniform

Real Estate Contract with Irene C

Sweeney (hereinafter,

•'Sweeney") for the purchase of certain real property located in
Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
56.

That Uniform Real Estate Contract was recorded in the

Salt Lake County Recorder's Office in Book 4944, pages 63-65.
57.

The terms of the contract are specifically set forth in

the Uniform Sales Contract attached to this Complaint as Exhibit
No. 1., and the referenced property is more completely described
in Exhibit No. 1.
58.

Sweeney had previously been deeded the referenced

property by the Defendant.
59.

Based on the information available to the Plaintiff, it

appears that at the time UD0T deeded the referenced property to
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Defendant Sweeney, UDOT did not have clear title to the property.
60.

Beginning in June of 1985 and through March of 1986,

the Plaintiff repeatedly tendered to Sweeney the remainder of the
purchase price due on the property specified in Exhibit No. 1.
61.

Initially, Sweeney negotiated with the Plaintiff to

determine the pay-off amount on the property, but beginning in
July 1985, Sweeney would no longer accept the Plaintiff's
payments on the property and would not discuss a payoff with the
Plaintiff.
62.

From July 1985, through March 1986, Sweeney would not

accept payments on the property from the Plaintiff.
63.

On or about November 21, 1985, unbeknownst to the

Plaintiff, Defendant Sweeney assigned her interest in the Uniform
Real Estate Contract evidenced by Exhibit No. 1 to UDOT.
64.

In March of 1986, the Plaintiff was informed by UDOT

that UDOT had been assigned Sweeney's interest in Exhibit No. 1.
65.

From March of 1986, through January the Plaintiff

tendered monthly payments specified under the terms of Exhibit
No. 1 to UDOT.

However, UDOT refused to accept any payments

until January 1987, at which time UDOT accepted eighteen months
of payments, only enough to bring the payments current.
66.

In December 1986, the Plaintiff tendered a final

payment for the property to UDOT; however, UDOT refused to accept
the final payment.
67.

Beginning in March of 1986, and continuing through

August of 1991, the Plaintiff repeatedly attempted to make a
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final payment on the property to UDOT.
68.

UDOT, however refused to accept a final payment from

the Plaintiff unless:
i)' the Plaintiff would accept a "Quit Claim DeedM from UDOT
in lieu of a warranty deed, and
ii) unless the Plaintiff would sign a Release, absolving
UDOT from all liability, of any nature whatsoever, with
respect to the Plaintiff's purchase of the property.
69.

From March 1986 through August 1991, UDOT continually

refused to:
i) abide by the terms of Exhibit No. 1, and
ii) to accept the Plaintiff's offers of payment and to
provide the Plaintiff with a warranty deed and property
insurance as required by Exhibit No. 1.
70.

UDOT continually insisted that the Plaintiff had to

accept a quit claim deed rather than a warranty deed and that the
Plaintiff had to sign the referenced release, releasing UDOT from
all liability with respect to the Plaintiff's purchase of the
property before UDOT would preform its obligations under the
contract.
71.

At the time UDOT attempted to force the Plaintiff to

accept a quit claim deed in lieu of the Warranty Deed required by
the Contract, UDOT knew that it did not have clear title to the
property; nonetheless, UDOT attempted to deceive the Plaintiff
into talcing a quit Claim Deed in lieu of the Warranty Deed,
required to be delivered by the terms of the contract.
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72.

The actions of UDOT in attempting to force the

Plaintiff into accepting a quit claim deed in lieu of the
Warranty Deed, required by the Contract, when UDOT knew that it
did not have clear title to the property constitutes a breach of
UDOT's covenant of good faith and fair dealing with the
Plaintiff.
73.

As a direct and proximate result of UDOT's failure and

refusal to honor its obligations under the express terms of
Exhibit No. 1, UDOTfs refusal to provide the Plaintiff with a
warranty deed to the property, UDOTfs failure and refusal to
provide the Plaintiff with title insurance on the property, and
UDOT's attempt to defraud the Plaintiff, the Plaintiff was unable
to obtain clear title to the referenced property.
74.

As a direct and proximate result of UDOTfs actions

and/or inactions, the Plaintiff was denied the use and benefit of
the property.
75.

UDOT's failure and refusal to provide the Plaintiff

with a warranty deed to the property, UD0Tfs failure and refusal
to provide the Plaintiff with title insurance on the property,
and UDOT's attempt to defraud the Plaintiff, constitute a breach
of UDOT's covenant of good faith and fair dealing with the
Plaintiff.
76.

As a direct and proximate result of UDOT9s actions

and/or inactions, the Plaintiff has been damaged in an amount to
be proven at trial.
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FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Conspiracy to Defraud)

77.

The Plaintiff realleges the allegations set forth in

paragraphs Nos. 1 through 76 of this Complaint and incorporates
them as if fully set forth by this reference.
78.

On May 27, 1976, the Plaintiff entered into a Uniform

Real Estate Contract with Irene C. Sweeney (hereinafter,
••Sweeney11) for the purchase of certain real property located in
Salt Lake County State of Utah.
79.

That Uniform Real Estate Contract was recorded in the

Salt Lake County Recorderfs Office in Book 4944, pages 63-65.
80.

The terms of the contract are specifically set forth in

the Uniform Sales Contract attached to this Complaint as Exhibit
No. 1., and the referenced property is more completely described
in Exhibit No. 1.
82.

Sweeney had previously been deeded the referenced

property by the Defendant.
83.

Based on the information available to the Plaintiff, it

appears that at the time UDOT deeded the referenced property to
Defendant Sweeney, UDOT did not have clear title to the property.
84.

Beginning in June of 1985, and through March of 1986,

the Plaintiff repeatedly tendered to Sweeney the remainder of the
purchase price due on the property specified in Exhibit No. 1.
85.

Initially, Sweeney negotiated with the Plaintiff to

determine the pay-off amount on the property, but beginning in
July 1985, Sweeney would no longer accept the Plaintiff's
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payments on the property and would not discuss a payoff with the
Plaintiff.
86.

From July 1985, through March 1986, Sweeney would not

accept payments on the property from the Plaintiff.
87.

On or about November 21, 1985, unbeknownst to the

Plaintiff, Defendant Sweeney assigned her interest in the Uniform
Real Estate Contract evidenced by Exhibit No. 1 to UDOT.
88.

In March of 1986, the Plaintiff was informed by UDOT

that UDOT had been assigned Sweeney's interest in Exhibit No. 1.
89.

From March of 1986, through January the Plaintiff

tendered monthly payments specified under the terms of.Exhibit
No. 1 to UDOT.

However, UDOT refused to accept any payments

until January 1987, at which time UDOT accepted eighteen months
of payments, only enough to bring the payments current.
90.

In December 1986, the Plaintiff tendered a final

payment for the property to UDOT; however, UDOT refused to accept
the final payment.
91.

Beginning in March of 1986, and continuing through

August of 1991, the Plaintiff repeatedly attempted to make a
final payment on the property to UDOT.
92.

UDOT, however refused to accept a final payment from

the Plaintiff unless:
i) the Plaintiff would accept a "Quit Claim Deed11 from UDOT
in lieu of a warranty deed, and
ii) unless the Plaintiff would sign a Release, absolving
UDOT from all liability, of any nature whatsoever, with
15

respect to the Plaintiff's purchase of the property.
93.

From March 1986# through August 1991# UDOT continually

refused to:
i) abide by the terms of Exhibit No. 1, and
ii) to accept the Plaintiff's offers of payment and to
provide the Plaintiff with a warranty deed and property
insurance as required by Exhibit No. 1.
94.

UDOT continually insisted that the Plaintiff had to

accept a quit claim deed rather than a warranty deed and that the
Plaintiff had to sign the referenced release, releasing UDOT from
all liability with respect to the Plaintiff's purchase of the
property.
95.

At the time UDOT attempted to force the Plaintiff to

accept a quit claim deed in lieu of the Warranty Deed required by
the Contract, UDOT knew that it did not have clear title to the
property; nonetheless, UDOT attempted to deceive the Plaintiff
into taking a quit Claim Deed in lieu of the Warranty Deed,
required to be delivered by the terms of the contract.
96.

The actions of UDOT in attempting to force the

Plaintiff into accepting a quit claim deed in lieu of the
Warranty Deed, required by the Contract, when UDOT knew that it
did not have clear title to the property constitutes a conspiracy
to defraud the Plaintiff on the part of UDOT.
97.

As a direct and proximate result of UDOT's failure and

refusal to honor its obligations under the express terms of
Exhibit No. 1, UDOT's refusal to provide the Plaintiff with a
16

Warranty Deed to the property, UDOT f s failure and refusal to
provide the Plaintiff with title insurance on the property and
UDOT f s attempt to defraud the Plaintiff, the Plaintiff was unable
to obtain clear title to the referenced property.
98.

As a direct and proximate result of UDOT f s actions

and/or inactions, the Plaintiff was denied the use and benefit of
the property.
99. UDOT's failure and refusal to provide the Plaintiff
with a warranty deed to the property, UDOT's failure and refusal
to provide the Plaintiff with title insurance on the property and
UDOT's attempt to defraud the Plaintiff constitute a Conspiracy
on the part of UDOT to defraud the Plaintiff.
100. As a direct and proximate result of UDOT's actions
and/or inactions, the Plaintiff has been damaged in an amount to
be proven at trial.
W H E R E F O R E , the Plaintiff prays for relief as follows.
On the Plaintiff's First Cause of Action.
1.

for damages incurred by the Plaintiff as a direct and

proximate result of being denied the benefit and use of the
property from November 1985, through August 1991;
2.

for damages incurred by the Plaintiff as a direct and

proximate result of not being able to develop and sell the
property from November 1985, through August 1991;
3.

for legal costs incurred by the Plaintiff in attempting

to secure title to the property from March 1986 through August
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1991;
4.

for prejudgment at the rate of 10% as provided for by

statute from November 1985, through the date that judgment in
this matter is entered;
5.

for post judgment interest at the maximum legal rate as

provided for by statute from the date judgment in this matter is
entered until judgment is satisfied in full;
6.

for court and other costs incurred by the Plaintiff in

bringing this action, as provide for by Exhibit No. 1;
7.

for attorney's fees incurred by the Plaintiff in

bringing this action as provided for by Exhibit No. 1;
8.

for such other and additional relief as the court deems

just and proper under the facts of this case.
On the Plaintiff's Second Cause of Action.
1.

for damages incurred by the Plaintiff as a direct and

proximate result of being denied the benefit and use of the
property from November 1985, through August 1991;
2.

for damages incurred by the Plaintiff as a direct and

proximate result of not being able to develop and sell the
property from November 1985, through August 1991;
3.

for legal costs incurred by the Plaintiff in attempting

to secure title to the property from March 1986, through August
1991;
4.

for prejudgment at the rate of 10% as provided for by

statute from November 1985, through the date that judgment in
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this matter is entered;
5.

for post judgment interest at the maximum legal rate as

provided for by statute from the date judgment in this matter is
entered- until judgment is satisfied in full;
6.

for court and other costs incurred by the Plaintiff in

bringing this action, as provided for by Exhibit No. 1;
7.

for attorney's fees incurred by the Plaintiff in

bringing this action as provided for by Exhibit No. 1;
8.

for such other and additional relief as the court deems

just and proper under the facts of this case.
On the Plaintiff's Third Cause of Action.
1.

for damages incurred by the Plaintiff as a direct and

proximate result of being denied the benefit and use of the
property from November 1985, through August 1991;
2.

for damages incurred by the Plaintiff as a direct and

proximate result of not being able to develop and sell the
property from November 1985, through August 1991;
3.

for damages sustained by the Plaintiff as a direct and

proximate result of UDOT's unlawful taking of Plaintiff's
property.
4.

for legal costs incurred by the Plaintiff in attempting

to secure title to the property from March 1986, through August
1991;
5#

for prejudgment at the rate of 10% as provided for by

statute from November 1985, through the date that judgment in
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this matter is entered;
6.

for post judgment interest at the maximum legal rate as

provided for by statute from the date judgment in this matter is
entered until judgment is satisfied in full;
7.

for court and other costs incurred by the Plaintiff in

bringing this action, as provided for by Exhibit No. 1;
8.

for attorney's fees incurred by the Plaintiff in

bringing this action as provided for by Exhibit No* 1;
9.

for such other and additional relief as the court deems

just and proper under the facts of this case.
On the Plaintiff's Fourth Cause of Action.
1.

for damages incurred by the Plaintiff as a direct and

proximate result of being denied the benefit and use of the
property from November 1985, through August 1991;
2.

for damages incurred by the Plaintiff as a direct and

proximate result of not being able to develop and sell the
property from November 1985, through August 1991;
3.

for damages sustained by the Plaintiff as a direct and

proximate result of UDOT's breach of its covenant of good faith
and fair dealing.
4.

for legal costs incurred by the Plaintiff in attempting

to secure title to the property from March 1986f through August
1991;
5.

for prejudgment at the rate of 10% as provided for by

statute from November 1985, through the date that judgment in
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this matter is entered;
6.

for post judgment interest at the maximum legal rate as

provided for by statute from the date judgment in this matter is
entered until judgment is satisfied in full;
7.

for court and other costs incurred by the Plaintiff in

bringing this action, as provided for by Exhibit No. 1;
8.

for attorney's fees incurred by the Plaintiff in

bringing this action as provided for by Exhibit No. 1;
9.

for such other and additional relief as the court deems

just and proper under the facts of this case.
On the Plaintiff's Fifth Cause of Action:
1.

for damages incurred by the Plaintiff as a direct and

proximate result of being denied the benefit and use of the
property from November 1985, through August 1991;
2.

for damages incurred by the Plaintiff as a direct and

proximate result of not being able to develop and sell the
property from November 1985, through August 1991;
3.

for damages sustained by the Plaintiff as a direct and

proximate result of UDOT's breach of its covenant of good faith
and fair dealing.
4.

for legal costs incurred by the Plaintiff in attempting

to secure title to the property from March 1986, through August
1991;
5.

for prejudgment at the rate of 10% as provided for by

statute from November 1985, through the date that judgment in
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this matter is entered;
6.

for post judgment interest at the maximum legal rate as

provided for by statute from the date judgment in this matter is
entered until judgment is satisfied in full;
7.

for court and other costs incurred by the Plaintiff in

bringing this action, as provide for by Exhibit No. 1;
8.

for attorney's fees incurred by the Plaintiff in

bringing this action as provided for by Exhibit No, 1;
9.

for such other and additional relief as the court deems

just and proper under the facts of this case.
Dated this fr '

day of June 1994.

Charles A. Schultz
Attorney for Plaintiff
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